

# Unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol over noisy and lossy channels

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
# Summary of my talk

- Motivations for the security proof of the B92
- Introduction to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
- Unconditional Security of the B92 protocol
- Summary

- *K. Tamaki, M. Koashi,* and *N. Imoto,*Phys. Rev.Lett.**90**, 167904 (2003). (ch-loss free)
- K. Tamaki, and N. Lütkenhaus, to appear in Phys. Rev A. quantu-ph/0308048. (over noisy and lossy ch)

## Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

• A way to share a random bit string between Alice and Bob whose info leaks arbitrary small to Eve.



B92 (Bennett in 1992):  $|\varphi_0\rangle$  and  $|\varphi_1\rangle$ 

BB84 (Bennett and Brassard in 1984):  $|H\rangle$ ,  $|V\rangle$ ,  $|+45\rangle$ , and  $|-45\rangle$ 

## Motivations for security proof of the B92

- The B92 is the simplest QKD.
- Clarifies the role of the nonorthogonality in conveying secret information.

### Works related with Coherent Attack

D. Mayers, Lec-Notes in Comp Science, 1109, Springer (1996).

H. Inamori, et.al. quant-ph/0107017.

P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys.Rev.Lett, 85, 441, (2000).

M. Koashi and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. **90**, 057902 (2003).

D. Gottesman and H-K. Lo, quant-ph/0105121.

D. Gottesman, H-K. Lo, N. Lütkenhaus, and J. Preskill, quant-ph/0212066.


K. Tamaki, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto,

B92:

Phys. Rev.Lett.**90**, 167904 (2003). (ch-loss free)

K. Tamaki, and N. Lütkenhaus, to appear in Phys. Rev A.

## No Eve, noises and losses case (B92)



Single photon polarization

$$|\varphi_j\rangle \equiv \beta |0_x\rangle - (-1)^j \alpha |1_x\rangle, (j=0,1)$$

$$\mathcal{M}_{B92} = \{F_0, F_1, F_?\}$$

$$F_0 = |\overline{\varphi}_1\rangle\langle\overline{\varphi}_1|/2$$


$$F_1 = |\overline{\varphi}_0\rangle\langle\overline{\varphi}_0|/2$$

$$F_? = 1 - F_0 - F_1$$


$$|\overline{\varphi}_i\rangle \equiv \alpha|0_x\rangle + (-1)^j\beta|1_x\rangle, (j=0,1)$$

 $\overline{0}$  and  $\overline{1}$ : conclusive

?: inconclusive



#### The effects of noises



Noises, eavesdropping — Errors on the key

QKD is possible over ideal situations

How to distribute the identical and secure secret key under the existence of eavesdropping, noises and losses?


## Unconditional Security of the B92 protocol

#### Security against coherent attacks


### Assumptions

- ➤ Alice has a perfect single photon source.
- ➤ Bob's detector is ideal (no dark count).
- ➤ No channel losses (will be removed later)

## Outline of the security proof of the B92



## Basic concept 1 (classical error correction)



Compare the syndrome of the suitably chosen subsets

## Basic concept 2 (Bell state)

Alice 
$$1 \leftarrow \sigma_z$$
  $\sigma_z \rightarrow 1$ 

$$0 \leftarrow \sigma_z \rightarrow 1$$


$$0 \leftarrow \sigma_z \rightarrow 1$$

$$0 \leftarrow \sigma_z \rightarrow 0$$
A Bell State :  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_z\rangle_A |0_z\rangle_B + |1_z\rangle_A |1_z\rangle_B)$ 

- (1) The Bell state is a pure state. (No correlation with the third system)
- (2) The bit values are at random.

If Alice and Bob share pairs of the Bell state, the shared bit values are unconditionally secure.

## Basic concept 3 (The EDP based on CSS codes)



 $e_{bit}$ : error rate in  $Z(=\{|0_z\rangle, |1_z\rangle\})$  basis (bit error)

 $e_{phase}$ : error rate in  $X = \{|0_x\rangle, |1_x\rangle\}$  basis (phase error)

By using CSS codes that correct up to  $ne_{bit}$  bit errors and  $ne_{phase}$  phase errors, in the limit of large n,

 $n\left[1-h(e_{bit})-h(e_{phase})\right]$  Bell states can be distilled.

$$h(x) = -x \log_2 x - (1 - x) \log_2 (1 - x)$$

Alice

Bob



$$z \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sigma_z^{\vec{r_1}} \equiv \sigma_z^1 \otimes \sigma_z^3 & :1 & \longleftrightarrow & 1: \ \sigma_z^{\vec{r_1}} \equiv \sigma_z^1 \otimes \sigma_z^3 \\ \sigma_z^{\vec{r_2}} \equiv \sigma_z^2 \otimes \sigma_z^4 \otimes \sigma_z^5 & :1 & \longleftrightarrow & 0: \ \sigma_z^{\vec{r_2}} \equiv \sigma_z^2 \otimes \sigma_z^4 \otimes \sigma_z^5 \end{array} \right\} z$$

$$\mathcal{X} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sigma_x^{\vec{r_3}} \equiv \sigma_x^1 \otimes \sigma_x^3 \otimes \sigma_x^4 & :0 & \longrightarrow & \text{NG} \\ \sigma_x^{\vec{r_4}} \equiv \sigma_x^2 \otimes \sigma_x^6 & :1 & \longrightarrow & \text{OK} \\ \end{array} \right. \xrightarrow{\text{NG}} \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \sigma_x^{\vec{r_4}} \equiv \sigma_x^2 \otimes \sigma_x^6 \\ \text{NG} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \sigma_x^{\vec{r_4}} \equiv \sigma_x^2 \otimes \sigma_x^6 \\ \text{NG} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{Sign} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{OK} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} & \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{NG} & \text{NG} \\ \text{NG} \end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{l}$$


$$[\sigma_{\alpha}^{\vec{r_i}}, \sigma_{\beta}^{\vec{r_j}}] = 0$$
  $(\alpha, \beta = x, z, i = 1, 2, \cdots) : CSS Code$ 




By comparing the syndromes in both *z* and *x* basis and after performing Quantum error correction



No bit and phase errors in the basis states for the CSS codes



## Outline of the security proof of the B92




The final purpose of this protocol is to distill pairs of the Bell state for the unconditionally secure key.

## Protocol 1

#### (1) Filtering operation


$$(|\varphi_j\rangle \equiv \beta |0_x\rangle + (-1)^j \alpha |1_x\rangle)$$

Alice prepares 
$$|\Phi\rangle_{AB}$$
:  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0_z\rangle_A|\varphi_0\rangle_B + |1_z\rangle_A|\varphi_1\rangle_B) = \beta|0_x\rangle_A|0_x\rangle_B + \alpha|1_x\rangle_A|1_x\rangle_B$ 




Keep the qubit pairs that have passed the filtering


No Eve:  $(1_A \otimes F_S) |\Phi\rangle_{AB} \propto (|0_z\rangle_A |0_z\rangle_B + |1_z\rangle_A |1_z\rangle_B)$ 




 $n_{fil}$ : number of the states that have passed the filtering




#### (2) Bit error estimation



Test bits gives us a good bit error estimation on untested qubit pairs



Choose the CSS code that correct up to the estimated errors



The security of the *Protocol 1* depends on whether they can distill the Bell state or not.



- Protocol 1 is secure if the phase error rate estimation for the EDP based on CSS codes is precise.
- The phase error rate has to be estimated from the bit error rate.c

The phase error rate estimation from the bit error rate

Test bits 
$$\begin{cases} 0 \leftarrow \sigma_z & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 1 \\ 0 \leftarrow \sigma_z & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 0 \end{cases}$$
 Test bits 
$$1 \leftarrow \sigma_z & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 0 \end{cases}$$
 Test bits 
$$1 \leftarrow \sigma_z & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 0 \end{cases}$$
 Bob 
$$0 \leftarrow \sigma_x & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 1 \\ 0 \leftarrow \sigma_x & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 1 \\ 0 \leftarrow \sigma_x & & F_S & \sigma_z \rightarrow 1 \\ 0 \leftarrow \sigma_x \rightarrow 1 & \sigma_x \rightarrow 1 \\ 0 \leftarrow 1$$

Given  $\langle \Pi_{\text{bit}} \rangle_{obs}$ , how much is the upper bound of  $\langle \Pi_{\text{phase}} \rangle_{obs}$ ?

Note: It is dangerous to put some assumptions on the state.

$$\Pi_{\rm bit} = \frac{1}{2} |\Phi - \rangle \langle \Phi - | \oplus \frac{1}{2} |\Gamma - \rangle \langle \Gamma - |$$

Nonorthogonal

The bit error and the phase error have a correlation!!

$$\Pi_{\text{phase}} = 0 \oplus \left[ \alpha^2 |01_x\rangle \langle 01_x| + \beta^2 |10_x\rangle \langle 10_x| \right]$$

$$\Pi_{\text{phase}}^B$$

$$(|\Phi -\rangle \equiv \alpha |00_x\rangle - \beta |11_x\rangle)$$

$$(|\Gamma -\rangle \equiv \beta |01_x\rangle - \alpha |10_x\rangle)$$

: subspace  $H_L$  spanned by  $\{|00_x\rangle, |11_x\rangle\}$  Qubit space : subspace  $H_R$  spanned by  $\{|01_x\rangle, |10_x\rangle\}$ 


$$\langle \Pi_{\text{bit}} \rangle_{obs} = \underline{p_{\text{Red}}} \langle \Phi - \rangle_{obs} + (1 - p_{\text{Red}}) \langle \Gamma - \rangle_{obs}$$

$$\langle \Pi_{\text{phase}} \rangle_{obs} = \underline{p_{\text{Red}}} \, 0 + (1 - p_{\text{Red}}) \langle \Pi_{\text{phase}}^B \rangle_{obs}$$

Upper bound of  $\langle 01_x \rangle_{obs}$  for given  $\langle \Gamma - \rangle_{obs}$ ?

Consider any N-qubit state that is symmetric under any permutation


## Question



Test bit Untested bit

For given  $\langle \sigma_{\alpha} \rangle_{obs}$ , how much is the upper bound of  $\langle \sigma_{\beta} \rangle_{obs}$ ?

#### ANS,



$$(N \to \infty)$$

For the estimation, we are allowed to regard the state as having stemmed from Independently and Identically Distributed quantum source!


By using the method, we can estimate the upper bound of the phase error rate from the bit error rate.

We can distill the Bell states by the EDP based on CSS codes

Protocol 1 is unconditionally secure.

 $n_{fil} \left[ 1 - h(e_{bit}) - h(e_{phase}) \right]$  secret key can be distilled

## Outline of the security proof of the B92




Key words: Error correction, Bell state, Entanglement distillation protocol (EDP)

### Only the bit values on secret key are important

• They do not need to detect phase error positions!

#### The EDP based on CSS codes




#### Observation 2

Shor and Preskill (2000)


Due to the property of the Quantum decoding in CSS codes


No need for *Quantum* decode  $\rightarrow$  Classical decode

(*Note*: Phase error rate is still necessary for the decode)



## Reduction to the B92 protocol (Alice's side)







C-decode corresponds to the privacy amplification

Preparation of the B92 states

Classical bit error correction!!

## Reduction to the B92 protocol (Bob's side)





The filtering succeeds or not



Conclusive or not

$$\mathcal{M}_{B92} = \{F_0, F_1, F_?\}$$

The B92 measurement and classical error correction!

## A derivation of $\mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{B92}}$

$$F_{S}|0_{z}\rangle_{B}\langle 0_{z}|F_{S} = |\overline{\varphi}_{1}\rangle\langle\overline{\varphi}_{1}|/2 = F_{0}$$

$$F_{S}|1_{z}\rangle_{B}\langle 1_{z}|F_{S} = |\overline{\varphi}_{0}\rangle\langle\overline{\varphi}_{0}|/2 = F_{1}$$

$$1 - F_{0} - F_{1} = F_{?}$$

$$F_{S} = \alpha|0_{x}\rangle_{B}\langle 0_{x}| + \beta|1_{x}\rangle_{B}\langle 1_{x}|$$

$$|\overline{\varphi}_{j}\rangle \equiv \alpha|0_{x}\rangle + (-1)^{j}\beta|1_{x}\rangle, (j = 0, 1)$$

$$\langle\overline{\varphi}_{i}|\varphi_{j}\rangle = \delta_{i,j}$$

Success probability of the filtering

The probability of obtaining the conclusive event

## Summary of our proof

#### Protocol 1 (Secure)

 $n_{fil} \left[ 1 - h(e_{bit}) - h(e_{phase}) \right]$  secret key can be distilled

 $n_{fil}$ : number of the states that have passed the filtering




(reduction)

#### The B92

 $n_{conc} \left[ 1 - h(e_{bit}) - h(e_{phase}) \right]$  secret key can be distilled

 $n_{conc}$ : number of the states that result in conclusive events

### Example of the phase error estimation




Channel: 
$$\rho \to (1-p)\rho + p/3 \sum_{a=x,y,z} \sigma_a \rho \sigma_a$$
  $p$ : depolarizing rate

 $\frac{|\varphi_0\rangle}{|\varphi_1\rangle}$ : Two nonorthogonal single photon states

Small  $|\langle \varphi_0 | \varphi_1 \rangle|^2$  makes the estimation poor  $\uparrow$  Trade-off Large  $|\langle \varphi_0 | \varphi_1 \rangle|^2$  makes the signal vulnerable to noises

## Example of the security




G: Optimal net growth of secret key per pulse p: depolarizing rate

The B92 over loss-free channel is secure up to  $p\sim 3.4\%$  c.f The BB84:  $p\sim 16.5\%$  (Shor and Preskill , 2000)

## The B92 over lossy and noisy channel

Alice prepares 
$$|\Phi\rangle_{AB}$$
:  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0_z\rangle_A|\varphi_0\rangle_B + |1_z\rangle_A|\varphi_1\rangle_B) = \beta|0_x\rangle_A|0_x\rangle_B + \alpha|1_x\rangle_A|1_x\rangle_B$ 




$$F = \{F_S, \sqrt{1 - F_S^2}\}$$
$$F_S = \alpha |0_x\rangle_B \langle 0_x| + \beta |1_x\rangle_B \langle 1_x|$$

Bob

F succeeds or not

$$QND \rightarrow n = 1 \text{ and } n \neq 1$$

## Example of the security and estimation



G: Optimal net growth rate of secret key per pulse

 $\mathcal{P}$ : depolarizing rate T: the prob that Bob detects single photon

Channel: 
$$\rho \to T \left[ (1-p)\rho + p/3 \sum_{a=x,y,z} \sigma_a \rho \sigma_a \right] + (1-T) |Vac\rangle \langle Vac|$$

The vacuum state

## Summary

- We have proven the unconditional security of the B92 over lossy and noisy channel.
  - (Assumption:an ideal single photon source, an ideal photon counter that discriminates between single photon and the other states)
- Thanks to the filtering, we can upper bound the phase error rate from the bit error rate.
- Accuracy of the phase error estimation for the EDP based on CSS codes depends on the nonorthogonality. The poor estimation makes the B92 weaker against noises.
  - K. Tamaki, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto,
    - Phys. Rev.Lett.**90**, 167904 (2003). (ch-loss free)
  - K. Tamaki, and N. Lütkenhaus, To appear in Phys. Rev A. quantu-ph/0308048. (over noisy and lossy ch)